In the current global political environment, antisemitic speech is sadly becoming a more regular issue which regulators are having to grapple with. The events of the recent weeks have served to highlight that there is currently a crisis in respect of antisemitism which has been escalating since 7 October 2023. Antisemitic language and expression, whether on social media or elsewhere fuels antisemitic violence and such conduct is rightly regulated when it comes to regulated professionals. 

The recent High Court decision in the case of Husain v SRA [2025] EWHC 1170 (Admin) is a significant one for such cases. Our previous insight outlining general considerations for regulating social media misconduct among professionals summarised the decision in respect of limits on freedom of speech. This insight considers Husain v SRA in detail to review how courts are defining antisemitism. 

The background 

On 14 May 2025, the High Court handed down the judgment in the appeal of Husain v SRA. Mr Justice Chamberlain dismissed Mr Husain’s appeal following findings by the tribunal that he had engaged in antisemitic and offensive tweets on X, resulting in Mr Husain being struck off the Roll.  

Mr Husain had appealed against the tribunal’s findings and the sanction imposed on various grounds, including most significantly that his right to freedom of speech had been breached and also that the Solicitors Disciplinary Tribunal (SDT) had erred in relying on the International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance (IHRA) working definition of antisemitism.  

Capsticks were instructed by the Solicitors Regulation Authority (SRA) in both the High Court and the underling proceedings in the SDT, with Louise Culleton acting on behalf of the SRA before the SDT and as junior counsel to Adam Solomon KC in the appeal. Partner John Tippett-Cooper and Principal Associate Lyndsey Farrell were instructing solicitors in both the SDT and the appeal. 

The High Court’s judgment: what amounts to antisemitic speech? 

In respect of what amounted to antisemitic speech, Chamberlain J set out how that should be approached, referring to the case of PSA v GPhC & Ali [2024] EWHC 577 (Admin) (the second appeal of that case and also a Judgment of Chamberlain J). He set out how antisemitism is to be defined and confirmed that it is appropriate for tribunals to use the IHRA working definition of antisemitism to assist their considerations. 

He indicated that most of the IHRA’s examples accompanying the definition are unobjectionable and useful (bearing in mind that they are only examples and will inevitably depend on language and context). 

As per his judgment in PSA v GPhC & Ali: “Antisemitism is hatred or hostility towards Jews as a racial and/or religious group. That hatred or hostility can be manifested in different ways. As the IHRA working definition points out, contemporary examples include ‘mendacious, dehumanizing, demonizing, or stereotypical allegations about Jews as such or the power of Jews as collective – such as, especially but not exclusively, the myth about a world Jewish conspiracy or of Jews controlling the media, economy, government or other societal institutions’. There are many conspiracy theories circulating, based on these kinds of stereotypical allegations. These conspiracy theories are expressions and instruments of racism, not just crackpot musings. It is important to recognise them as such.” 

Chamberlain J warned that particular care was required in the application of the seventh and eighth examples of the IHRA working definition. These examples are i) denying Jewish people their right to self-determination, such as by claiming that the existence of a State of Israel is a racist endeavour, and ii) applying double standards by requiring of Israel a behaviour not expected or demanded of any other democratic nation.  

Chamberlain J indicated that “where speech is said to fall within the seventh and eighth of the IHRA’s examples, it is unlikely that the substantive content of the message alone will justify the label ‘antisemitic’. However, depending on the language used, and in context, the speech may be antisemitic. The focus of the court or tribunal should therefore be on the language and context.” 

Similarly, in respect of the tenth IHRA example of “drawing comparisons of contemporary Israeli policy to that of the Nazis”, such comparisons “could, depending on the context”, be antisemitic. However, Chamberlain J further acknowledged that: “Comparisons between the policy of Nazi Germany and that of any other government are apt to be incendiary. Making such a comparison with Israel is likely to be especially hurtful. That is not enough on its own to take speech outside the protection of Article 10. However, the language or imagery of Nazism is often used as a taunt, which deliberately references and weaponises the most painful events in Jewish history, to which some Jews alive today are witnesses and which continue profoundly to affect many others. Depending on the context, a criticism of Israel which pointedly uses Nazi language and imagery as a racialised taunt of this kind could reasonably be regarded as antisemitic.” 

Who is the “reasonable reader” in this case? 

For cases involving antisemitic speech, the approach will be “to ask whether the statement or conduct in question would be regarded as antisemitic to an observer with a reasonable understanding of the main historical and cultural manifestations of antisemitism”.  The plain “reasonable reader” test is not sufficient in cases where such a hypothetical individual may not have the necessary knowledge about antisemitism as a historical and cultural phenomenon and may not know the sometimes-coded language or images used, or the tropes deployed. 

In his judgment, Chamberlain J said the IHRA working definition and examples will assist tribunals, as will case law interpreting the definition or commenting on the examples. Furthermore, depending on the nature of the antisemitic speech – or the approach of the practitioner and his defence – it is not wrong in principle for a tribunal to be assisted by expert evidence on the issue if necessary. 

In the first PSA appeal in PSA v GPhC & Ali ([2021] EWHC 1692), the following was also set out: “The test applied by the FPC was whether a reasonable person with all the relevant information would consider the words to be antisemitic: The ‘reasonable person’ in the Committee’s mind therefore is someone who is in possession of all the facts and knows the context; someone with no particular characteristics... This reasonable person therefore would know what a Zionist is and how that is defined; would know the IHRA definition of anti-Semitism and its associated guidance; would know the dictionary definition of “antisemitism” etc. This reasonable person would have no strong views on the Israel/Palestinian question; would not otherwise be unduly sensitive; would be open-minded, balancing what they had heard and seen before reaching a conclusion...” 

This is also an important issue to consider in terms of the presentation of evidence in such cases. If social media posts require deeper knowledge, understanding or analysis of the context and history to explain why they are considered to be antisemitic, an appropriate route is for such evidence to be formally presented by an expert witness. It cannot necessarily be presumed that experienced members of the tribunal will be aware of the relevant history or context of contemporary antisemitism, or indeed of historical tropes. A panel is after all dependent on evidence, so an expert who can speak to such issues is an appropriate way of presenting such evidence rather than it falling back on the advocate to give evidence on the subject (which they should not be doing). 

Conclusion 

The decision in Husain v SRA provides important clarification on how antisemitic speech is assessed. While reliance on the IHRA working definition is appropriate, the Court makes clear that context and language remain central to any assessment. 

For regulators, this reinforces the need for a careful, evidence-based approach. In particular, attention should be given to how posts may be understood by an informed observer and whether additional evidence is required to establish meaning and context. 

How Capsticks can help  

Capsticks’ market-leading professional regulatory team advises a wide range of regulators on complex issues, including those explored in this insight. Our specialists are experienced in cases involving offensive and discriminatory social media activity, from drafting allegations through to tribunal advocacy and appeals. Please contact Partner John Tippett-Cooper to find out more about how Capsticks can help.