R (on the application of Carmen Castro Guallichico) v London Borough of Southwark [2026] EWHC 1665 (Admin)

High Court - 3 July 2026

The High Court has held that a Council’s housing allocation process did not discriminate against a family with disabled children

The Claimant (“Ms Castro Guallichico”) and her husband had four sons. The youngest two (“N and M”) had an autism spectrum disorder and complex needs. The family moved to their current home, a two-bedroom private sector flat with a living room, in 2015, when they only had only two sons. N and M shared a bed with their parents, with the other two sons sleeping in the other bedroom.

Ms Castro Guallichico joined London Borough of Southwark’s (“The Council”) housing register in 2018. In June 2023, Ms Castro Guallichico’s housing needs were assessed and she was awarded Band 2 priority. In December 2023, her housing need was reassessed as being for a five-bedroom property and, in January 2024, an occupational therapist also concluded that a five-bedroom home in the same area was required for the family.

The Council allocated social housing primarily through a “choice based lettings” (“CBL”) scheme, whereby housing applicants bid for advertised properties through an online system. The majority of allocations were made via the CBL scheme. Alongside this, the Council reserved the right to make direct offers to certain applicants. These direct offers were made to those families on a direct offer waiting list. In February 2024, the Council confirmed that housing applicants who had been identified to receive a direct offer were placed on the direct offer waiting list in date order, noting any specific property recommendation, risk areas, category of need and the number of people and beds required. Housing offers were “generally made in date order, having regard of the above categories and needs/risks." In August 2024, the Council confirmed that Ms Castro Guallichico’s household had been placed on the direct offer waiting list “in date order”.

However, in September 2024, Ms Castro Guallichico issued a claim in the County Court, alleging a breach of the Equality Act 2010 (specifically, the failure to make reasonable adjustments). The proceedings were settled, with the Council agreeing to place the household in Band 1 of the housing register. However, the household continued to drop down the waiting list for four and five-bedroomed houses.

Ms Castro Guallichico applied for judicial review of the allocation of social housing by the Council, arguing that its direct offer waiting list did not appear to follow any logical or discernible order, and that households that had had to wait less time than her were being made offers. She also argued that some households were marked as having “enhanced priority”, but her household had not been designated in this category despite their circumstances. Ms Castro Guallichico alleged that: (1) the Council had breached its direct offer procedure in her family’s case; (2) the Council had provided insufficient transparency regarding the operation of the direct offer waiting list; and (3) the Council was in breach of the public sector equality duty under section 149 of the Equality Act 2010 in relation to their operation of the waiting list.

The High Court, in dismissing the claim for judicial review, held that (1) the Council had not breached its direct offer procedure. The scheme operated principally through the CBL scheme, with the direct offers list being an additional, discretionary route in cases of urgency. Priority for direct offers was based on the date that a household was agreed for a direct offer, but depending on urgency, a relevant senior officer could enhance priority for a direct offer. Enhanced priority had been given to households, enabling them to receive offers of four and five-bedroomed properties before Ms Castro Guallichico, but this was consistent with the CBL scheme; (2) Transparency would have been better if the CBL scheme had been more detailed; however, the lack of clarity did not render it unlawful; and (3) the Council had conducted an equality impact assessment prior to adopting the CBL scheme and monitored it annually, demonstrating due regard to the public sector equality duty, There was insufficient material to support a contention that disabled households were disadvantaged by its CBL scheme.

A copy of the judgment is here.

R. (on the application of AA) v London Borough of Waltham Forest [2026] EWCA Civ 626

Court of Appeal - 19 May 2026

The Court of Appeal has held that the steps to allocate social housing fall outside of the scope of personal housing plans.

The respondent (“AA”), who had a post-traumatic stress disorder and had been granted refugee status in the United Kingdom, applied to the London Borough of Waltham Forest (“The Council”) for housing assistance under Part 7 of the Housing Act 1996. The Council accepted that it owed AA the main housing duty under section 193(2) of the Housing Act 1996 to secure suitable accommodation. However, a dispute arose between AA and the Council over what type of permanent accommodation would bring the Council’s housing duty to an end

Following an assessment, the Council had provided AA with suitable accommodation on a temporary basis. However, AA contended that only social housing under Part 6 of the Housing Act 1996 would be suitable, whilst the Council held the view that private-sector rented accommodation with reasonable adjustments would meet her needs. Consequently, the personal housing plan prepared by the Council for AA contained the steps it would take to identify suitable private-sector rented accommodation for AA.

AA brought a claim for judicial review. The High Court dismissed the aspects of the claim which had alleged that the Council had erred by concluding that private-sector rented accommodation would be suitable for AA. However, the Court concluded that the Council’s failure to assist AA in her application for social housing in her personal plan was “unreasonable”. The Court therefore allowed the claim on this ground only. The Council appealed.

The Court of Appeal, in allowing the appeal, held that Part 6 and Part 7 of the Housing Act 1996 are separate statutory schemes. It held that the steps that a Council may take under Part 7 of the Housing Act 1996 do not include steps concerned with the allocation of housing accommodation under Part 6 of the Housing Act 1996. Assessing a housing application, deciding whether to allocate housing, and making an offer of housing are all taken under Part 6 and must comply with the Council’s allocation scheme. Therefore, a personal plan could not include steps that would materially influence the allocation of Part 6 housing, as that would conflict with the obligation to allocate accommodation in accordance with the relevant scheme.

The clarification provided by this ruling will be welcomed by local authorities who produce personal plans for housing applicants.

A copy of the judgment is here.

Zaman v Leeds City Council [2026] UKUT 180 (LC)

Upper Tribunal (Lands Chamber) - 7 May 2026

The Upper Tribunal has held that a building's status as an HMO under the Housing Act 2004 does not prevent each dwelling within it from being treated as a separate house for selective licensing purposes.

The appellant (“Mr Zaman”) owned a house in a selective licensing area (and which had been a selective licensing area since January 2020), which had been converted into four residential flats. Z failed to apply for any licence until July 2024 when, following a council inspection, he was given a financial penalty of £2,125 for each of the four flats, issued under section 95 of Part 3 of the Housing Act 2004.

Mr Zaman appealed to the First-tier Tribunal (Property Chamber), arguing that his house was a house in multiple occupation (“HMO”) within section 254(4) of the Housing Act 2004 and therefore the four flats were not caught by the selective licensing scheme. Alternatively, it meant that any offence committed was one to licence the house as an HMO, meaning that only a single financial penalty (rather than four) should have been imposed.

The First-tier Tribunal upheld the financial penalties in respect of each flat. It also held that a potential exemption under section 85(1) of the Housing Act 2004 did not apply as the property was not an HMO to which Part 2 (“Licensing of houses in multiple occupation”) applied. Mr Zaman appealed, with the key issue being whether a building that qualified as an HMO under section 254(4) of the Housing Act 2004 prevented individual flats within it from being treated as houses for Part 3 selective licensing purposes.

The Upper Tribunal (Lands Chamber), in dismissing the appeal, held that each flat could still be a house under Part 3 of the Housing Act 2004, despite the building's status as an HMO. It held that the First-tier Tribunal was correct to find that the building was not a Part 2 HMO and therefore not excluded from Part 3 by section 85(1) of the Housing Act 2004. Following the previous ruling in Northumberland Mews Ltd v Thanet District Council [2022] UKUT 179 (LC), a building and the flats within it can both be Part 3 houses. Section 85(1) of the Housing Act 2004 specifically excludes only HMOs to which Part 2 applies, and Parts 2 and 3 represent different regimes with different objectives.

The clarification provided by this ruling, particularly on the relationship between Parts 2 and 3, will be welcomed by local authorities operating selective licensing schemes

A copy of the judgment is here.

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