Kaur v Birmingham City Council 

County Court (Birmingham) 

28 February 2025  

The County Court has held that an agreement was a licence and not a tenancy. 

In 2018, Ms Kaur applied to Birmingham City Council for accommodation after she, her partner and three children had become homeless. In February 2019, Birmingham City Council accepted that it owed an interim duty under section 188(1) of the Housing Act 1996 and secured emergency accommodation for Ms Kaur and her family at a Travelodge. Ms Kaur’s relationship with her partner ended shortly after and he left the accommodation. In August 2018, Ms Kaur and her children were moved to more suitable temporary accommodation. In September 2018, Birmingham City Council notified Ms Kaur that it owed her the main housing duty under section 193 of the Housing Act 1996. Ms Kaur and her children continued to live at the property. 

In February 2019, following complaints from Ms Kaur as to the suitability of the property, she was granted a licence to occupy a three bedroom property. The licence agreement included the following:

• Birmingham City Council could move Ms Kaur and her children to alternative accommodation, or require her to share the property with other homeless applicants;  

• Ms Kaur was not permitted to allow any person to live with her without obtaining prior agreement from Birmingham City Council;  

• The licence could be terminated if Ms Kaur was absent from the property for more than two nights at a time; and  

• Birmingham City Council could access the property without notice in an emergency and to undertake repairs.  

In June 2021, Ms Kaur’s solicitor issued a letter of claim for disrepair to Birmingham City Council. This was rejected in July 2021, with the Council denying that it was subject to “any repairing obligations for the property” and stating that there was “no contractual obligation between Birmingham City Council and your client in respect of repairs”.  

Ms Kaur asserted that “in reality” she occupied the property as tenant under a lease and so Birmingham City Council was subject to the implied repairing covenants under the Landlord and Tenant Act 1985 and the duty under the Defective Premises Act 1972. Birmingham City Council claimed that these did not apply because the agreement was a licence. 

The County Court, in dismissing the claim, held that the agreement had created a licence. The obligation to share the property with other applicants and the fact that Birmingham City Council could move Ms Kaur to other accommodation meant that the agreement was inconsistent with granting Ms Kaur exclusive possession of the property. The fact that the agreement used the word ‘licence’, ‘tenancy’ or ‘lease’ was “largely irrelevant”. The agreement gave Birmingham City Council control over who could live or stay overnight at the property; how long Ms Kaur could be away from the property, and the power to terminate the agreement when it wanted to. 

A copy of the judgment is here (taken from the Nearly Legal website) 

Beach v South Hams District Council [2025] EWCA Civ 609  

Court of Appeal 

9 May 2025 

The Court of Appeal has held that a housing applicant had made himself intentionally homeless by failing to remain in the accommodation provided by the local housing authority. 

Mr Beach, who was separated from his wife, applied to South Hams District Council for accommodation for himself and two of his children who were to live with him. In January 2023, South Hams District Council accepted that Mr Beach was homeless and had a priority need for accommodation. It accepted an interim duty under the Housing Act 1996 and provided temporary accommodation in a hotel. Mr Beach failed to remain in that accommodation. In March 2023, a child arrangement order was made, providing for two of the children to live with Mr Beach and, subsequently, South Hams District Council accepted that it owed him a duty under section 193 of the Housing Act 1996. However, in April 2023, the children were removed from his care after a police investigation found him living with the children in a shipping container. 

South Hams District Council offered Mr Beach accommodation at a Travelodge and subsequently offered accommodation for him alone at another hotel. The accommodation was considered suitable "based on [Mr Beach’s] household needs at the point of presentation”, as the children were now living with their mother. Mr Beach did not take up the accommodation, explaining that it was not suitable because he could not accommodate his children in the single room and that he had a dog on which he was reliant (and pets were not allowed at the accommodation). South Hams District Council notified Mr Beach that he had made himself intentionally homeless by failing to occupy the room at the hotel and therefore its duty under section 193 of the Housing Act 1996s.193 had ended. The decision was upheld on review.  

Mr Beach appealed but this was dismissed by the County Court. He subsequently appealed to the Court of Appeal. 

The Court of Appeal, in dismissing the appeal, held that South Hams District Council was entitled to only offer Mr Beach temporary accommodation for himself alone. The children had been removed from his care and the authorities had concluded that the children should remain with their mother. Mr Beach had been aware of the basis on which the accommodation was offered to him. He had accepted the offer, knowing that it was only a single room. 

A copy of the judgment is here. 

Norton v London Borough of Haringey [2025] EWCA Civ 746

Court of Appeal 

17 June 2025 

The Court of Appeal has held that a lawful housing needs assessment is not a prerequisite for determining the suitability of accommodation offered to a housing applicant. 

Mr Norton had been offered accommodation by the London Borough of Haringey under section 193(2) of the Housing Act 1996. However, Mr Norton requested a review stating that the accommodation was unsuitable (based on noise nuisance from a neighbour and the accommodation’s  layout, which he claimed was dangerous for him to use on account of his epilepsy) and that London Borough of Haringey had not undertaken a section 189A housing needs assessment to determine its suitability, nor provided a personalised housing plan. This request was rejected by London Borough of Haringey following a review. Mr Norton appealed, but this was dismissed by the County Court. Mr Norton appealed again.

The Court of Appeal, in dismissing the appeal, held that a local housing authority is not precluded from making an independent assessment of the suitability of offered accommodation, even in the absence of compliance with the section 189A housing needs assessment requirement. It argued that it was “impossible to conclude that Parliament can have intended that an otherwise lawful offer, which would have the direct effect of immediate relief of homelessness, would be invalid and unlawful for lack of a section 189A assessment.” 

This decision will be welcomed by local housing authorities, as lawful decisions around suitability of accommodation can be made in advance of a section 189A housing needs assessment. 

A copy of the judgment is here. 

London Borough of Enfield v Beckford [2025] EWHC 1218 (Admin) 

High Court 

19 May 2025 

The High Court has held that a noise abatement notice was not necessarily invalid when no required steps were specified within it. 

Mr Beckford lived in a house which shared a party wall with neighbours. Following complaints made by his neighbours, an environmental health officer from London Borough of Enfield assessed that the noise coming from his house constituted a nuisance. Consequently, London Borough of Enfield issued an abatement notice, requiring him to cease the noise nuisance, prevent its recurrence, and exercise proper control of the volume of sound generated to ensure that it was not likely to cause a nuisance to residents in the vicinity. No breach occurred after the notice was issued, but Mr Beckford appealed against it under the Environmental Protection Act 1990 and the Statutory Nuisance (Appeals) Regulations 1990.  

The District Court held that although the issue of the notice had been justified, it was defective because it did not specify the steps that Mr Beckford had to take to abate the nuisance. London Borough of Enfield appealed. 

The High Court, in allowing the appeal, held that one had to look at substance, not form. The notice clearly required an abatement of the noise nuisance. It left it up to the respondent to decide how to achieve that. The notice told Mr Beckford what he had done and what he was required to do. Consequently, it was a reasonable to presume that a recipient of the notice would know that the complaint was that the music was being played too loudly and that the volume needed to be turned down. If there was any unhelpful or unnecessary wording, the Court had the power to vary it to ensure clarity. That was not to salvage the validity of an inherently invalid notice, but to avoid any confusion. 

A copy of the judgment is here.