The Harrold proceedings initially began in 2005. Registered Nurse Mrs Alivida Harrold was dismissed by her employer and subsequently struck off the register by the Nursing and Midwifery Council (NMC) in 2009. In the 16 years that followed, Mrs Harrold has brought numerous claims against North Bristol NHS Trust (the Trust) and the NMC, attempting to litigate her dismissal and strike-off, including before the Employment Appeals Tribunal, County Court, High Court and Court of Appeal. She has also raised complaints about the legal representatives of the Trust and the NMC. Her litigation was largely unsuccessful.

The decision handed down in the latest case concerning Mrs Harrold, Attorney General v Harrold [2026] EWHC 2025 (Admin), provides lessons for regulators dealing with Registrants who bring vexatious legal proceedings. This insight considers the options sought by the NMC to limit the proceedings of Mrs Harrold, this latest decision and how it may advantage regulators when dealing with vexatious complaints going forwards.

What are ‘vexatious’ proceedings and how can you deal with them?

Although a ‘vexatious’ litigant has no formal definition, Lord Bingham confirmed in the case of Attorney General v Barker [2000] 1 FLR 759 that the characteristics of vexatious proceedings are that they have “little or no basis in law; [their] effect is to subject the defendant to inconvenience, harassment and expenses out of all proportion to any gain likely to accrue to the claimant: and [they involved] the abuse of proceed of the court meaning… for a purpose or in a way which is significantly different from the ordinary and proper use of the court process”.

In order to limit proceedings being brought by an aggrieved Registrant, there are two orders to consider: a General Civil Restraint Order and a Civil Proceedings Order.

General Civil Restraint Order (GCRO)

A GCRO is a court order issued against a litigant who persistently brings claims or applications that are "totally without merit", effectively barring them from initiating any new proceedings in the High Court, County Court or in Employment tribunals without prior judicial permission. This order typically lasts for up to two years and serves as a powerful shield for defendants – such as regulators – against individuals who use the legal system to harass or relitigate settled disputes.

Civil Proceedings Order (CPO)

A CPO is an indefinite, high-level restraint issued by the High Court under section 42 of the Senior Courts Act 1981 against a person who has "habitually and persistently" instituted vexatious legal proceedings without any reasonable ground. Once a CPO is in place, the individual is permanently prohibited from starting or continuing any legal action in any civil court unless they first obtain leave from a High Court judge.

Given the restrictive nature of a CPO, the three-stage test for imposing such an order requires that:

1. It must be established that there have been vexatious legal proceedings without reasonable grounds;
2. Those proceedings must have been instituted “habitually or persistently”; and
3. They must have commenced in the High Court or any inferior court.

Background to Attorney General v Harrold

Mrs Harrold had been subject to a GCRO since May 2016, on account of the number of claims she brought against the Trust, the NMC and their legal providers following her dismissal and subsequent strike-off. This GCRO had been extended on six occasions.

Between 2016 and 2025, Mrs Harrold made a number of additional applications in respect of the GCRO, appealing the decision and seeking to discharge it.

As the GCRO did not appear to deter Mrs Harrold from seeking to raise claims, the Attorney General (the AG) applied for a CPO in 2025.

In Attorney General v Harrold, the GCRO was used in an attempt to prevent further proceedings being brought. The High Court considered that Mrs Harrold used the two-year renewal cycle of a GCRO as a recurring opportunity to relitigate the original dispute(s). The Court therefore considered that the extensive attempts at litigation across 16 years met the “habitual” threshold for a CPO. An indefinite ban on Mrs Harrold bringing proceedings without the permission of the High Court was implemented in February 2026.

The impact on a Registrant’s Article 6 right

In the judgment, the Court noted that imposing a CPO could impact upon the Article 6 right to a fair trial if a Registrant is limited in bringing proceedings. However, the importance of a CPO is not to prevent an individual from bringing proceedings, but rather to require leave of the Court in question (in the present case, the High Court) in order to do so.

The imposition of a CPO can therefore be considered in conjunction with an individual’s Article 6 rights.

Who can make an application for a CPO?

While a regulator can make an application for a GCRO, the power to apply for a CPO is vested exclusively in the AG.

In the present case, an application was made for the Trust and the NMC to be joined as parties to the CPO application. This application was refused by the Court on the grounds that the imposition of a CPO was a matter of overall public interest and should most appropriately be brought by the AG. It was considered that if the NMC and the Trust were added as parties, the proceedings could appear to be adversarial rather than a neutral assessment of Mrs Harrold’s conduct. In this way, the CPO remained an independent judicial safeguard. The Court was also aware that intervention by third parties could strain court resources further, working against the rationale for a section 42 application. It applied the principles set out in the case of Betta Oceanway Company & SC Tomini Tading SRL v Georgios Vatistas [2025] EWCA Civ 595, noting third parties will not be joined unless it is “desirable’”.

Conclusion

It may be helpful for regulators to know that they can, in the first instance, apply directly to the Court for a GCRO if they are experiencing persistent unmerited claims from a Registrant. Although they are unable to apply for a CPO should the GCRO not achieve the desired deterrence, Harrold has positively shown that the AG is willing to step in when a regulator has reached the limit of what a GCRO can achieve.

While only the AG can make an application for a CPO, a regulator can initiate the process via reporting vexatious activity to the AG’s office and providing evidence. It may also advocate that a referral is made by judges dealing with vexatious litigation as and when it occurs.

Capsticks’ view

The bar will always be high for the application of a CPO – but it remains a consideration for regulators in the extreme. It is likely that regulators will have devoted substantial resources (including financial) to such cases, particularly when repeated extensions of a GCRO have been sought, and the option of a CPO will be welcome relief to them in these situations.

Where the AG applies for a CPO and regulators are not given permission to join proceedings, any concerns and impacts can be advocated by the AG, even though they are acting in the public interest rather than advocating on their behalf. Ultimately, Attorney General v Harrold provides reassurance to regulators that more enduring protections are available where persistent litigation continues despite existing safeguards.

How Capsticks can help

If you are a regulator considering applying for a GCRO or advocating for a CPO against a vexatious litigant and would like further advice as to your options, or if you have any queries around what's discussed in this article and the impact on your organisation, please speak to Regulatory Principal Associate Caroline Collins or Associate Poppy George to find out more about how Capsticks can help.