R. (on the application of Grant) v London Borough of Barking and Dagenham [2026] EWHC 754 (Admin) 

High Court - 18 February 2026

The High Court has held that a local authority did not act unlawfully or irrationally in offering hotel accommodation to a large family on a temporary basis.

Miss Grant was a single mother with five children aged 12 to 19 who lived in rented accommodation. In May 2025 she was served with a section 21 notice and contacted the London Borough of Barking and Dagenham (“the Council”) for housing assistance under the Housing Act 1996. On 9 June 2025, the Council informed Miss Grant by letter that it was subject to the prevention duty under section 195 of the Housing Act 1996. The letter set out the circumstances in which that duty may come to an end, including the expiry of a 56-day period.

In October 2025 a possession order was granted and Miss Grant was served with a notice of eviction. On 20 January 2026, the Council accepted that Miss Grant was homeless due to the eviction notice.

Miss Grant launched judicial review proceedings against the Council over its handling of her homelessness application, arguing that the Council had reason to believe that she might become homeless and in priority need, and interim accommodation should have been provided immediately. She claimed that the only accommodation that had been offered to her was two small rooms in a hotel without cooking facilities and this was unsuitable accommodation for a family of her size.

The High Court, in dismissing the application for judicial review, held that the Council had not acted unlawfully in its performance of its statutory duties under the Housing Act 1996. The Court held that

1. The Council had correctly accepted the prevention duty under section 195 of the Housing Act 1996 and the relief duty under section 189B(2) when Miss Grant became homeless.
2. The Council had accepted that Miss Grant was homeless once it became clear that she would be evicted. The Council had accepted the interim accommodation duty under section 188 of the Housing Act 1996 but was not required to immediately provide accommodation where the housing applicant still occupied a property – even if there was a threat of imminent eviction. The relief duty had not yet expired, meaning the main housing duty under section 193 of the Housing Act 1996 had not yet engaged.
3. The Council’s offer of two hotel rooms on an interim basis, whilst not ideal, was not unlawful or irrational. The offer was within established guidance and the accommodation was to be limited to six weeks until more suitable accommodation could be found.
4. The 56-day period ran from 20 January 2026, the date the Council accepted Miss Grant as homeless, rather than 9 June 2025.

The decision will be welcomed by local authorities. It highlights that accommodation which may be deemed unsuitable for housing applicants in the long term may be considered suitable in the short term.

A copy of the judgment is here.

R. (on the application of Olaifa) v London Borough of Bexley [2026] EWHC 1945 (Admin)

High Court - 29 July 2026

The High Court has dismissed a challenge to a local housing authority's provision of temporary accommodation to a family, which included a disabled child.

In March 2019, Ms Olaifa, a single mother with three children including a disabled son with Autism Spectrum Disorder, applied to London Borough of Bexley (”The Council”) for homeless assistance.

The Council accepted that it owed Ms Olaifa the main housing duty under section 193 of the Housing Act 1996 and provided her with temporary three-bedroomed accommodation, where the family resided for five years. Subsequently, on 19 September 2025, the Council made a final offer of permanent social housing, provided by a registered provider of social housing at 51 Peareswood Road, under section 193 of the Housing Act 1996. Ms Olaifa accepted the offer and, accordingly, the Council informed her on 8 December 2025 that its duty to her had been discharged by reason of her accepting the permanent accommodation. The Claimant did not seek a seek a review of that decision.

However, on 11 December 2025, the registered provider of social housing informed Ms Olaifa that it would not proceed with the offer of the permanent property because she had been abusive towards its staff and refused to consent to relevant checks. Consequently, the Council informed Ms Olaifa that its main housing duty to her under section 193 of the Housing Act 1996 had been discharged by reason of her effective refusal of the permanent property. That decision was upheld on review. The deadline for appealing that decision was 1 June 2026 but no appeal was brought by that date. However, Ms Olaifa subsequently applied for permission to appeal the review decision out-of-time.

On 30 June 2026, the Council made Ms Olaifa a further offer of temporary accommodation (91 Templar Drive), pending the determination of the out-of-time appeal.

Ms Olaifa brought a claim for judicial review, challenging the Council's provision of temporary accommodation under section 193(2) of the Housing Act 1996 and contending that the Council had breached its Public Sector Equality Duty under s.149 of the Equality Act 2010 in regard to her disabled son, failed to make arrangements for ensuring that her son's welfare was safeguarded under section 11 of the Children Act 2004 and failed to comply with the family's human rights under Article 8 (right to respect for a private and family life) of the European Convention on Human Rights (“ECHR”).

The High Court, in dismissing the claim for judicial review, held that:

1. The claim was academic – the Council’s legal duty no longer related to the premises because the main housing duty under section 193 of the Housing Act 1996 had been discharged when it offered Ms Olaifa alternative accommodation at 51 Peareswood Road and 91 Templar Drive.
2. Ms Olaifa had an adequate alternative remedy through statutory review under section 202 of the Housing Act 1996 and appeal to the County Court under section 204 of the Housing Act 1996, which could encompass all of her grounds of complaint, including the Public Sector Equality Duty, Children Act 2004 and ECHR Article 8 challenges.
3. The Council had properly considered the disabled son's needs and had not breached its statutory duties or the family's human rights.

A copy of the judgment is here.

*UPDATE* – R. (on the application of AA) v London Borough of Waltham Forest [2026] EWCA Civ 626

The Court of Appeal decision in R. (on the application of AA) v London Borough of Waltham Forest [2026] EWCA Civ 626 was published in our June/July edition (see below). In June 2026, AA applied to the Supreme Court for permission to appeal this decision. However, on 6 October 2026, the Supreme Court refused the permission to appeal, finding that the application “does not raise an arguable point of law.” This final decision will therefore be welcomed by local authorities.

R. (on the application of AA) v London Borough of Waltham Forest [2026] EWCA Civ 626

Court of Appeal - 19 May 2026

The Court of Appeal has held that the steps to allocate social housing fall outside of the scope of personal housing plans.

The respondent (“AA”), who had a post-traumatic stress disorder and had been granted refugee status in the United Kingdom, applied to the London Borough of Waltham Forest (“The Council”) for housing assistance under Part 7 of the Housing Act 1996. The Council accepted that it owed AA the main housing duty under section 193(2) of the Housing Act 1996 to secure suitable accommodation. However, a dispute arose between AA and the Council over what type of permanent accommodation would bring the Council’s housing duty to an end

Following an assessment, the Council had provided AA with suitable accommodation on a temporary basis. However, AA contended that only social housing under Part 6 of the Housing Act 1996 would be suitable, whilst the Council held the view that private-sector rented accommodation with reasonable adjustments would meet her needs. Consequently, the personal housing plan prepared by the Council for AA contained the steps it would take to identify suitable private-sector rented accommodation for AA.

AA brought a claim for judicial review. The High Court dismissed the aspects of the claim which had alleged that the Council had erred by concluding that private-sector rented accommodation would be suitable for AA. However, the Court concluded that the Council’s failure to assist AA in her application for social housing in her personal plan was “unreasonable”. The Court therefore allowed the claim on this ground only. The Council appealed.

The Court of Appeal, in allowing the appeal, held that Part 6 and Part 7 of the Housing Act 1996 are separate statutory schemes. It held that the steps that a Council may take under Part 7 of the Housing Act 1996 do not include steps concerned with the allocation of housing accommodation under Part 6 of the Housing Act 1996. Assessing a housing application, deciding whether to allocate housing, and making an offer of housing are all taken under Part 6 and must comply with the Council’s allocation scheme. Therefore, a personal plan could not include steps that would materially influence the allocation of Part 6 housing, as that would conflict with the obligation to allocate accommodation in accordance with the relevant scheme.

The clarification provided by this ruling will be welcomed by local authorities who produce personal plans for housing applicants.

A copy of the judgment is here.