Munemo v Wolverhampton City Council [2026] EWCA Civ 329

Court of Appeal - 20 March 2026

The Court of Appeal has held that a housing applicant was intentionally homelessness after being evicted for deception.

Ms Munemo was the secure tenant of a flat owned by Birmingham City Council. However, whilst she was still a tenant, she applied in writing to Wolverhampton Council (“The Council) for homelessness assistance without informing the Council that she already had an ongoing tenancy of a flat and wrongly stating that she had never been a council tenant. The Council granted her a secure tenancy of a house. However, when it discovered that Ms Munemo held two tenancies, it successfully obtained a possession order and she was evicted. The District Court found that the Council had been induced to grant the tenancy by the false statement made by Ms Munemo, and that it was therefore reasonable and proportionate to make the possession order.

Ms Munemo then re-applied for housing assistance, but the Council found her to be intentionally homeless because she had deliberately and fraudulently obtained a tenancy, resulting in her losing the property. The decision letter identified her “deliberate act” as “fraudulently obtaining tenancy with [the Council] whilst maintaining tenancy in Birmingham. Your deliberate action was the effective cause of you losing your accommodation … .” The decision letter concluded that “I have decided that it was reasonable for you to have continued to occupy your home immediately before you took the actions that you did.” That decision was upheld on review.

Ms Munemo appealed the decision, arguing that the Council had erred in holding that she was intentionally homeless on the basis that it would have been reasonable for her to continue to occupy. She argued that it was unreasonable to occupy accommodation against the wishes of the Council where the tenancy had been obtained by deception. The County Court quashed the Council's decision, applying a principle from Chishimba v Kensington & Chelsea RLBC [2013] EWCA Civ 786, and finding where an applicant obtained a tenancy of a property by deception, it could not be said that the applicant had accommodation that it was reasonable for them to continue to occupy. Ms Munemo was not intentionally homelessness under section 191 of the Housing Act 1996. The Council appealed.

The Court of Appeal, in allowing the appeal, held that housing applicants should not be able to rely on their own deliberate acts to support the unavailability of accommodation or the unreasonableness of continued occupation. The evidence showed that the house offered by the Council was satisfactory and reasonable for Ms Munemo to continue to occupy, had she not ceased occupation because of her deception. There was no justification for extending the principle in the Chishimba ruling (where a lack of entitlement to housing assistance, not the housing applicant's deception, had been the cause of her not being able to occupy). Extending the principle in Chishimba would mean that any housing applicant who obtained the grant of a tenancy by deception would not be intentionally homeless if that deception caused them to cease to occupy their accommodation. Ms Munemo’s deception had entitled the Council to recover possession. Ms Munemo was therefore intentionally homeless.

This ruling will be welcomed by local authorities, as it clarifies the law on intentional homelessness where a housing applicant’s homelessness is caused by their eviction for fraudulently obtaining social housing.

A copy of the judgment is here.

R. (on the application of Walker) v Bromley LBC [2026] EWHC 382 (Admin)

High Court - 23 February 2026

The High Court has dismissed as ‘academic’ a claim for judicial review by a homeless applicant after a local authority subsequently made an offer of accommodation.

A homeless applicant (“Ms Walker”) applied to the London Borough of Bromley (“The Council”) for homelessness assistance under Part 7, Housing Act 1996. Ms Walker was living in a privately rented property with her 12 year old daughter, but her landlord had given notice that she wished to sell the property. Ms Walker had several physical and mental health conditions. The Council decided that Ms Walker was eligible for assistance and that she was homeless, and accepted that it had a duty to take reasonable steps to help her to secure accommodation.

Ms Walker wanted to be provided with temporary accommodation within only a few days, but when this was not forthcoming she filed a claim for judicial review and made an application for interim relief. She argued that the Council had failed to secure her accommodation under sections 188 and 189B of the Housing Act 1996, alleging breach of statutory duty under the Act, procedural unfairness, breach of the Public Sector Equality Duty under section 149 of the Equality Act 2010, breach of Article 8 of the European Convention of Human Rights (“right to respect for private and family life”), and failure to provide adequate reasoning. However, on the same day, the Council offered Ms Walker a flat in nearby Croydon (“the Croydon flat”) as temporary accommodation. Ms Walker accepted the offer, but did not take up occupation due to some concerns with the heating there and due to the fact that she had not yet been evicted from her privately-rented property. A few days later, the Council wrote to Ms Walker to say that it accepted that it owed her the full housing duty, and that she was homeless, eligible for assistance, had a priority need and did not become homeless intentionally.

The Hight Court, in dismissing the claim for judicial review, held the claim was “academic”, as the Council had offered Ms Walker temporary accommodation – the Croydon flat – and had subsequently accepted the full housing duty under section 193 of the Housing Act 1996. Although Ms Walker had raised concerns about the suitability of the Croydon flat, these were not pleaded in the actual claim form. The Court urged her to accept the offer of the Croydon flat, even if she also intended to seek a review of its suitability.

A copy of the judgment is here.

Housing 35 Plus Ltd v Nottingham City Council [2026] EWCA Civ 204

Court of Appeal - 14 January 2026

The Court of Appeal has held that a co-operative society’s rules failed to meet HMO licensing exemptions.

The local authority (“Nottingham City Council”) issued Housing 35 Plus Ltd, a co-operative society, with two financial penalty notices of £15,000 each after finding that it was managing or being in control of two houses in multiple occupation (“HMO”) that had not been licensed – a breach under section 72(1) of the Housing Act 2004. Housing 35 Plus Ltd appealed to the First-tier Tribunal, arguing that because it was a co-operative society the two properties were exempt under paragraph 2B of Schedule 14 of the Housing Act 2004 and therefore no offence had been committed. The First-tier Tribunal ruled in favour of Housing 35 Plus Ltd, finding that it was a co-operative society and that it had met the conditions of paragraph 2B, thus exempting the two properties from HMO licensing. Nottingham City Council appealed.

The Upper Tribunal (Lands Chamber), in allowing the appeal, held that the First-tier Tribunal had erred – the rules of Housing 35 Plus Limited did not ensure that all of its management decisions were made by its members at a general meeting, which was required by paragraph 2B. Instead, the general meeting's role was to discuss management decisions made by the management committee, rather than making those decisions themselves. The management committee was authorised to make day-to-day management decisions according to the aforementioned rules. Consequently, paragraph 2B was not satisfied and therefore the two properties were HMOs and subject to licensing requirements. The matter was remitted to the First-tier Tribunal for further consideration of other issues raised in the appeal. Housing 35 Plus Ltd appealed.

The Court of Appeal, in dismissing the appeal, upheld the Upper Tribunal's (Lands Chamber) finding that rules of a registered co-operative society did not secure that all its management decisions were made by the members in a general meeting. That requirement, imposed by paragraph 2B of Schedule 14 of the Housing Act 2004, was a condition of exemption from HMO licensing. Rule 30 of Housing 35 Plus Ltd’s rules stated that “The functions of ordinary general meetings shall be to discuss all management decisions ... that have arisen since the last general meeting.” As stated in the Upper Tribunal (Lands Chamber) ruling, as a matter of ordinary language, “to discuss” was not the same as “to decide.” Where the rules intended the general meeting to make decisions, they used explicit language such as “decide” or “resolution.” Rule 30 did not say that the general meeting was to decide all management decisions, only to discuss them. Consequently, reading the word “discuss” as if it meant “discuss and decide, to the exclusion of the committee, all management decisions” was not justified by the wording of Rule 30.

The ruling makes clear that the exemption under paragraph 2B of Schedule 14 of the Housing Act 2004 only applies where members of a co-operative society make all management decisions.

A copy of the judgment is here.