City of London Corp v Bussandra [2025] EWCA Civ 1580

Court of Appeal - 5 December 2025

The Court of Appeal has clarified the meaning of "deliberately" when determining whether a housing applicant with an alleged mental illness had become intentionally homeless.

Mr Bussandra had a long history of depression, anxiety and obsessive compulsive traits. He mutually exchanged his accommodation in London for a tenancy of a flat in Brighton in November 2015. However, in January 2016, Mr Bussandra gave notice to end his tenancy, citing intimidation, harassment and the theft of his post by his neighbours. He moved back to London and applied for housing. City of London Corporation accepted that Mr Bussandra was homeless, eligible for assistance and had a priority need, but considered that he was intentionally homeless under section 191 of the Housing Act 1996. Mr Bussandra requested a review of the decision, arguing that when he had surrendered the flat he had suffered a major depressive episode that had affected his thinking - meaning that it was not a deliberate act. His argument was backed by a mental health clinician's opinion. However, on review, the reviewing officer concluded that Mr Bussandra did not have mental health problems and his decision was deliberate. Mr Bussandra successfully appealed the reviewing officer’s decision at the County Court, which found that the reviewing officer had not applied the correct legal test when considering whether Mr Bussandra’s decision to terminate his tenancy was deliberate, that his reasons for departing from the clinician's view were inadequate and that he had “paid no more than lip service” to the public sector equality duty. City of London Corporation appealed.

The Court of Appeal, in allowing the appeal, held that the correct approach to defining "deliberately" in section 191 of the Housing Act 1996 was to give it its ordinary meaning. It was not necessary for an individual to lack mental capacity to argue that their act was not deliberate. However, just because a mental health condition had played a significant role in a decision did not necessarily mean that it was not deliberate, otherwise anyone who “chose not to pay rent or to hand back keys while suffering from mild depression could argue that mental health problems played a significant role and so that the decision was not deliberate”. It held that the reviewing officer had applied the correct test (in accordance with the Homelessness Code of Guidance for Local Authorities), asking whether Mr Bussandra’s decision was deliberate or was a result of an inability to manage his own affairs, mental illness or temporary aberrations. He had found that Mr Bussandra had wanted to return to London even before the thefts and had not received the abuse or threats that he had alleged. The Court of Appeal agreed with his conclusion that Mr Bussandra had made an “unwise decision” and “merely regretted moving to Brighton”.

The ruling provides useful guidance for local authorities when determining whether a housing applicant with mental health issues has acted deliberately when giving up reasonable accommodation under section 191 of the Housing Act 1996.

A copy of the judgment is here.

Cifci v Sutton LBC [2025] EWCA Civ 1480

Court of Appeal - 19 November 2025

The Court of Appeal has held that a local authority was entitled to find a housing applicant intentionally homelessness - despite the applicant receiving notice to vacate his temporary accommodation.

Until September 2018, the Appellant (“Mr Cifci”) lived with his family in privately-rented accommodation. After being asked to leave his accommodation by the landlord, Mr Cifci applied to the London Borough of Bromley ("Bromley Council”") for housing assistance. He was provided with temporary accommodation at Church Road, but in November 2021 the property manager served him with a notice to vacate, as the landlord intended to take back the property. Bromley Council informed Mr Cifci that it would offer him an alternative accommodation before the notice period expired and did so on 14 January 2022. The offer letter stipulated that Mr Cifci had to accept the offer and that a refusal would result in Bromley Council discharging its housing duty and no further offers would be made. After visiting the property in Brighton Road, Mr Cifci expressed his unhappiness about it and refused the offer. Bromley Council confirmed that its duty to re-house him had ended and that he had to immediately vacate his current property as the lease end deadline had already passed.

Mr Cifci said that he had nowhere else to go and asked Bromley Council to offer him “more suitable housing”. Bromley Council offered him temporary accommodation in the High Street in the borough of Sutton until 14 February 2022, which he accepted. On 13 April 2022 (after leaving the temporary accommodation), Mr Cifci applied to the London Borough of Sutton (“Sutton Council”) for housing assistance. Sutton Council accepted that he was homeless and had a priority need but concluded that he was intentionally homeless after refusing an offer of alternative accommodation and that it therefore did not have a duty to re-house him. The decision was upheld following a review. Mr Cifci appealed, but this was dismissed by the County Court. Mr Cifci further appealed, arguing that he was not intentionally homeless, as he had done nothing to cause him to cease to occupy Church Road; it was the landlord wanting the property back that caused him to leave.

The Court of Appeal, in dismissing the appeal, held that Mr Cifci had given up the property in Church Road not, as he had claimed, because the landlord wanted to recover possession, but because he was no-longer owed any housing duty. Neither the landlord nor Bromley Council had issued or even threatened possession proceedings against Mr Cifci and he had not vacated the property immediately. It was only after Bromley Council had offered him further accommodation that he moved out. He had therefore vacated Church Road because of the offer of temporary accommodation in the High Street in Sutton. It was therefore reasonable for the review officer to conclude that Mr Cifci ceasing to occupy Church Road was a result of his refusal of the Brighton Road accommodation, despite declining to leave Church Road. The Court held that although the landlord's notice to vacate the property could be seen as a cause of Mr Cifci's departure from his accommodation, his refusal of suitable alternative accommodation was at least “one operative cause” of his homelessness. Consequently, he was intentionally homeless.

The ruling will be welcomed by local housing authorities. It highlights that if a local housing authority offers alternative accommodation to a housing applicant after a landlord decides to take back their property, but the offer is refused, the applicant cannot immediately reapply in an attempt to get better accommodation, believing that they are safe to do so because they are not intentionally homeless and that the local housing authority has an obligation to rehouse them

A copy of the judgment is here.

R. (on the application of RR) v Enfield LBC [2025] EWCA Civ 1390

Court of Appeal - 5 November 2025

The Court of Appeal has held that there is no “free-standing duty” under the public sector equality duty to monitor or collect housing allocation statistics.

The Appellant (“RR”) was married with two young children and was a carer for his disabled wife. On 8 November 2022, RR applied for housing assistance from the London Borough of Enfield (“The Council”) and the family was initially placed in bed and breakfast accommodation between 18 November 2022 and 9 March 2023. The Council accepted that RR was owed a housing duty under section.193(2) of the Housing Act 1996 and, in March 2023, the family was moved into a one-bedroom flat. However, following the birth of his second child, RR told the Council that the one-bedroom flat was no longer suitable.

The Council’s housing allocation scheme (1) awarded 200 points to homeless persons living in its accommodation under section 193 of the Housing Act 1996, and (2) awarded additional points (50 or 150) for low or medium health and wellbeing needs, but excluded homeless persons from receiving these additional points. On 20 February 2023, RR was awarded 200 points by the Council under the allocation scheme, as they were homeless and living in its accommodation. However, RR sought a review of the decision, contending that he should have been awarded reasonable preference on grounds of health and wellbeing. The reviewing officer upheld the Council’s decision and, subsequently, RR applied for judicial review, claiming that the allocation scheme (1) was indirectly discriminatory under section 19 of the Equality Act 2010, (2) breached the duty to make reasonable adjustments under section 20 of the Equality Act 2010, and (3) breached the public sector equality duty (“PSED”).

The High Court dismissed the first two claims, but did find a breach of the PSED. RR appealed to the Court of Appeal regarding the dismissal of the sections 19 and 20, claims, and the Council cross-appealed the PSED finding.

The Court of Appeal, in dismissing the appeal, upheld the High Court's findings regarding sections 19 and 20, but found that it had erred in concluding that the Council’s “failure to monitor” and collect statistics relating to housing allocations to disabled households had resulted in a breach of the PSED. The Court held that (1) RR had failed to demonstrate that the Council was indirectly discriminatory and had put homeless households with a disabled member at a particular disadvantage compared to homeless households without a disabled member; (2) it would not be reasonable for the Council to depart from its lawful housing allocation scheme; and (3) there is no “free-standing duty to monitor or collect statistics”, as the PSED only requires a public authority to have “due regard” to specified equality considerations when “exercising its functions” - not a “free-standing duty to monitor or collect statistics”.

The ruling will be welcomed by local housing authorities, as it clarifies when the collection of housing allocation statistics is and isn’t necessary for the correct discharge of the PSED.

A copy of the judgment is here.

R. (on the application of Robles) v Lewisham LBC [2025] EWHC 2745 (Admin)

High Court - 24 October 2025

The High Court has held that a housing authority had acted lawfully when it allocated a new banding date to an existing housing applicant following her application for higher priority under its new housing allocation scheme.

The Claimant (“Ms Robles”) lived with her adult daughter in a privately-rented one-bedroom flat in a converted house. The flat was very small; it had no living room, and Ms Robles and her daughter had to share a bed. On 10 May 2021, Ms Robles applied to the London Borough of Lewisham (“The Council”) for social housing and was placed in Band 3 under its 2017 Housing Allocation Scheme, which reflected that her accommodation was overcrowded by one bedroom. In 2022, the Council published a new Housing Allocation Scheme, which came into effect on 31 October 2022. Under the new 2022 Scheme, Ms Robles was automatically placed into the new Band 4 (lowest priority) as someone who was overcrowded in settled accommodation requiring one additional bedroom. Following this decision, Ms Robles was informed that she could apply to be placed in Band 3 if she required one additional room and was statutorily overcrowded. When Ms Robles submitted a change of circumstances form on 27 December 2022, the Council initially rejected it but then on 21 July 2023 accepted that her flat was statutorily overcrowded, making her eligible for Band 3. However, the Council determined that her Band date should be 27 December 2022 rather than her original Band date of 10 May 2021, although it later changed this date to 31 October 2022, (the date that the new Scheme had come into effect).

Ms Robles brought judicial review proceedings to challenge the Council's refusal not to allow her to retain her original Band date of 10 May 2021.

The Court, in refusing the application for judicial review, held that the Council was entitled to automatically designate Band 4 to all pre-existing one-bedroom overcrowded applicants under the 2022 Scheme. It found that the Council had not acted unlawfully in not giving Ms Robles her old Band date when she successfully applied to be moved to Band 3, stating that it was a matter for the local authority to determine how its housing allocation scheme should be formulated and that section 159(7) of the Housing Act 1996 gave local housing authorities a “wide discretion” to do so.

A copy of the judgment is here.

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