Oxford Hotel Investments Ltd v Great Yarmouth BC [2025] UKUT 387 (LC)

Upper Tribunal (Lands Chamber) - 24 November 2025

The Upper Tribunal has held that a microwave cannot be deemed as “cooking facilities” when defining an HMO under the Housing Act 2004.

Oxford Hotel Investments Ltd (“OHIL”) owned a building which it used, in part, to accommodate homeless persons placed there under an arrangement with Great Yarmouth Borough Council (“The Council”) under its homelessness housing duties. Following an inspection by the Council, it was established that 32 of the 62 bedrooms in the building were used as homelessness accommodation and that each room contained a fridge, a microwave, a shower, hand basin and toilet, but lacked a food preparation area, or storage for cutlery/crockery. Due to the fact that the rooms lacked cooking facilities, the Council deemed the building to be a house in multiple occupation (“HMO”) under section 254 of the Housing Act 2004. OHIL appealed to the First-tier Tribunal, arguing that a microwave satisfied the definition of “cooking facilities”, but the Council’s decision was upheld. OHIL appealed.

The Upper Tribunal (Lands Chamber), in dismissing the appeal, held that the provision of a microwave did not amount to cooking facilities within the meaning of the Housing Act 2004. It opined that as the Housing Act 2004 intended to protect vulnerable and disadvantaged occupiers, it was unlikely that Parliament had intended that statutory regulation could be escaped by simply “plugging in a microwave”. Consequently, the absence of cooking facilities meant that the building met the standard test for an HMO under the Housing Act 2004.

The decision will be of interest to local authorities, as it provides more clarification when deciding whether to declare a building an HMO.

A copy of the judgment is here.

Beacon Cymru Group Ltd (formerly Coastal Housing Group Ltd) and another v Mitchell and another [2025] EWHC 2477 (Ch)

High Court - 2 October 2025

The High Court has dismissed tenants’ claims for rent repayment after missing electrical condition reports rendered social housing in Wales unfit for habitation.

The Renting Homes (Wales) Act 2016 came into force on 1 December 2022. Prior to this date, Mrs Mitchell was a tenant of Beacon Cymru Group, one of the social housing landlords involved in this case. However, from 1 December 2022, she occupied her home pursuant to a secure occupation contract as a contract holder.

The landlords had been required, under the Renting Homes (Wales) Act 2016, to provide the tenants (now contract-holders) with electrical condition reports (ECRs). However, when the landlords obtained these reports, they failed to pass them on to the tenants by the required dates. Consequently, the properties were deemed unfit for human habitation under the Renting Homes (Fitness for Human Habitation) (Wales) Regulations 2022, and the tenants were not therefore legally required to pay rent. However, both the landlords and tenants were unaware of the situation and the tenants had continued to pay their rent. When the oversight was discovered several months later, the tenants were given the ECRs. However, the tenants made a restitutionary claim for repayment of the rent they had paid (when they were not legally required to pay rent), arguing that the landlords had been unjustly enriched by the rent they had paid by mistake during the breach period.

The High Court, in dismissing the claim, held that the landlords' mistake in failing to provide the ECRs had not caused the tenants to pay rent when they were not required to do so, as the tenants admitted that they would have paid regardless, for fear of eviction. It found that it had not been unjust for the landlords to retain the rent paid during this period, and that, in any case, restitution was not appropriate where the contract between the parties subsisted, and no damage or loss had been sustained by the tenants.

Welsh housing authorities will welcome this decision, as it clarifies the limits of statutory rent remedies, the unavailability of restitution where there is no causative mistake, and the absence of a statutory right to set off historic rent payments. Whilst landlords should ensure that they uphold their statutory obligations, the decision does provide them with some legal protection from retrospective rent recovery claims, particularly where ECRs are subsequently provided to contract-holders.

A copy of the judgment is here.

R. (on the application of Lewis) v Southwark LBC [2025] EWHC 3271 (Admin)

High Court - 12 December 2025

The High Court has held that a council's failure to identify a housing applicant’s homelessness application did not mean that it owed her a duty, as the application did not meet the statutory definition of homelessness.

In 2007, the Claimant (“Ms Lewis”), who suffered from significant mental health issues, applied for assistance under Part 7 of the Housing Act 1996. After being given temporary accommodation, the London Borough of Southwark (“The Council”) accepted that it owed Ms Lewis the main housing duty under section 193 of the Housing Act 1996, as she was then in priority need, being a person with whom dependent children resided. The Council provided Ms Lewis with permanent accommodation, but she declined the offer, deeming the property to be unsuitable. The Council notified her that the housing duty had been discharged. This decision was upheld on review, but Ms Lewis did not appeal.

In 2012, Ms Lewis reapproached the Council for housing assistance after her temporary accommodation had been cancelled. The Council treated this as an application under Part 6 of the Housing Act 1996 and placed her on its social housing waiting list. After putting her in contact with a housing association, Ms Lewis was granted an assured shorthold tenancy. However, in 2022, the housing association sought possession of the property on the basis of the expiry of the superior lease, and Ms Lewis therefore approached the Council for assistance. The housing association subsequently discontinued the possession proceedings due to the claim having been brought too late.

In 2024, Ms Lewis – who was still living in the housing association property – launched judicial review proceedings against the Council, contending that her approach to the Council should have been treated as an application under Part 7 of the Housing Act 1996 and that a decision should be made on that application. The Council argued that no homelessness application had been made in 2012 and that, even if it had, it would inevitably have been rejected as being based on the same facts as the 2007 application.

The High Court, in dismissing the claim for judicial review, held that delay of almost 12 years in Ms Lewis bringing the challenge meant that it was out of time. While Ms Lewis’ actions in 2012 were sufficient to constitute a fresh homelessness application under Part 7 of the Housing Act 1996, its facilitation of an assured shorthold tenancy before her previous tenancy had ended meant that she had never become homeless as defined in section 175 of the Housing Act 1996. Even if the Council had correctly identified the application, no statutory duty under the Housing Act 1996 would have arisen, because the “factual predicate for those duties – homelessness – never materialised”. Also, the applications Ms Lewis made for homelessness assistance in 2022 and 2024 superseded her earlier 2012 application and therefore rendered the claim academic.

Whilst local authorities will welcome the decision, the ruling highlights the importance of recognising when a homelessness application is actually being made.

A copy of the judgment is here.

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