Banfield v Swale Borough Council [2025] UKUT 235 (LC) 

Upper Tribunal (Lands Chamber) - 17 July 2025

The Upper Tribunal (Lands Chamber) has held that a local authority was entitled to impose a financial penalty on a landlord who had failed to comply with an improvement notice.

Mr Banfield held a long lease of a flat which was let out on an assured shorthold tenancy to Mr Mutishev and his partner (“the tenants). Following an inspection by its housing officers, Swale Borough Council (“the Council”) identified several hazards at the property, including one Category 1 hazard (excess cold: space heating not effective, and a number of broken or faulty windows) and six Category 2 hazards (including damp and mould – with no extractor fan in the kitchen or bathroom – a defective lock on the front door, a shower not working correctly, an intermittent hot water supply to the bath tub, a defective handrail on the stairs, electrical hazards, and fire hazards (no smoke alarm)).

The Council served Mr Banfield with an improvement notice and set a date by which the work had to be completed. After the deadline had passed, the Council conducted a further inspection and found that almost none of the work had been completed. It issued Mr Banfield with a financial penalty. Mr Banfield stated that he was appealing the improvement notice, but was told that his appeal was not valid. Mr Banfield also stated that he had served a section 21 notice requiring the tenants to leave the property and would therefore not be doing any more of the required work. He was going to renovate the property once it was vacant and then sell it.

Mr Banfield appealed to the First-tier Tribunal, arguing that he had done some of the work and that the outstanding work had not been completed because the tenants had refused to grant him access to the property. Therefore, he argued, he was not in breach of the improvement notice because he had a reasonable excuse for not completing the works. At the appeal, the First-tier Tribunal reduced the penalty imposed by the Council on Mr Banfield. However, Mr Banfield appealed this decision, arguing that he should not have to pay a penalty at all, as he had not done anything wrong and that, insofar as work had not been done, that was due to the various obstacles in his way, in particular the non-co-operation of the tenants.

The Upper Tribunal (Lands Chamber), in dismissing the appeal, held that too much of Mr Banfield’s non-compliance with the improvement notice could not be explained by his alleged problems with obtaining access to the property, Mr Banfield had offered no other reason as to why the improvement works had not been done and therefore the reduced penalty stood.

A copy of the judgment is here.

Fertre v Vale of White Horse District Council [2025] EWCA Civ 1057 

Court of Appeal - 31 July 2025

The Court of Appeal has confirmed that a housing applicant with pre-settled status is not entitled to an allocation of housing under the Housing Act 1996.

The appellant (“Ms Fertre”) had moved from France to Britain before the end of the Brexit transition period and had been granted pre-settled status under Article 18 of the UK-EU Withdrawal Agreement (“WA”). She applied to the Vale of White Horse District Council (“the Council”) to be placed on its housing register for allocation of housing under the Housing Act 1996. However, the Council said that she was ineligible because she only held pre-settled status and was an economically inactive person.

Ms Fertre made a further application, this time on the basis of homelessness, but this was also refused due to ineligibility. She subsequently sought a review under section 202 of the Housing Act 1996, but the Council upheld its initial ineligibility decision, on the basis that Ms Fertre had not been economically active in the UK. The right to equal treatment under Article 23 of the WA, as a result of her pre-settled status, did not require her to be treated as eligible. Ms Fertre appealed, but this was withdrawn when she was subsequently granted an assured shorthold tenancy.

Although Ms Fertre’s eligibility for housing had been resolved, it was held that the issue was of general public importance and should still be determined.

Ms Fertre argued that the refusal of her housing application was contrary to the equal treatment protections for EU citizens in the WA, and that the UK’s grant of pre-settled status was a “new residence status” created by the WA. Therefore, preventing her from receiving housing assistance under UK legislation was discriminatory and incompatible with the terms of the WA.

The High Court, in dismissing the appeal, held that UK law had not been altered by the WA. The new "new residence status" ( i.e. pre-settled status) under the WA was not a blanket conferment of residence rights. Its equal treatment provisions offered protection to those “residing on the basis” of the WA. This did not extend to those who resided solely on the basis of the “new residence status” issued under the WA. The WA did not specify a mechanism to confer residence status – it was a “one-off” passageway granting an individual with five years' leave to remain without conditions. The judge, in highlighting a flaw in the appeal, stated that, in his opinion, “the key point is that not all UK nationals qualify for housing assistance (because not all are habitually resident) and not all those with PSS (assuming I am wrong on the main issue) do not”. Therefore, not all British nationals would be entitled to support under the Housing Act 1996.

Ms Fertre appealed.

The Court of Appeal, in dismissing the appeal, held that:

Pre-settled status is a domestic law right, more generous than the scheme of EU rights of residence, but it did not expand rights granted under the WA and only granted rights and permission in domestic law.

Article 18 of the WA merely provides a “gateway” to access rights under the WA; it does not confer such rights itself.

The WA was not intended to create new EU law rights and, as Ms Fertre had no EU law right to reside in the UK as she did not meet the conditions in Article 7 of the Citizens' Rights Directive (i.e. being economically active or self-sufficient), she was therefore not entitled to protection under Article 23 of the WA.

This decision will be welcomed by local housing authorities, as it clarifies the rights of those with pre-settled status to assistance under the housing regime. It highlights that pre-settled status is only a “gateway” and does not provide those with such a status the right to residence.

A copy of the judgment is here.

Abdelrahman v London Borough of Islington [2025] EWCA Civ 1038

Court of Appeal - 31 July 2025

The Court of Appeal has held that a local authority’s tenant succession policy lawfully limited the definition of “stepchild” to a child of a person’s spouse by previous marriage or civil partnership.

Ms Abdelrahman’s mother (“Ms Patel”) had been in an intimate relationship with Mr Seales. However, they had maintained separate homes in Luton and London respectively, and had never married or entered into a civil partnership. Ms Abdelrahman had a loving relationship with Mr Seales and considered him a “father figure” and had lived with him for three years before he died. Following Mr Seales' death, Ms Abdelrahman applied to the London Borough of Islington (“the Council”) to succeed to the tenancy on the basis that she was Mr Seales' stepdaughter. The Council policy on succession was based on section 113 (“Members of a person's family”) of the Housing Act 1985 and stated that stepchildren could succeed to a tenancy if they had been living in the property for 12 months. However, the Council refused her application because Mr Seales and Ms Patel had never married or entered into a civil partnership. It is considered that a stepchild was a child born to or legally adopted by one party to a marriage prior to the marriage.

Ms Abdelrahman appealed to the County Court, arguing that the meaning of “stepchild” should be the one given by the online Oxford English Dictionary (updated in 2023) – " A person who is related to another as a result of a subsequent marriage or relationship of a parent, rather than through blood, a stepchild, step-parent, step-sibling etc." – which meant that it was not restricted to the child of a spouse. She also contended that the Council’s succession policy was unlawfully discriminatory, contrary to articles 8 (the right to respect for private and family life and home) and 14 (protection from discrimination) of the European Convention on Human Rights.

The County Court held that Ms Abdelrahman did not qualify to succeed to the tenancy. It rejected Ms Abdelrahman’s definition of “stepchild”, finding that it meant a child of a person's spouse or civil partner by a previous marriage or civil partnership. It also held that any difference in treatment between Ms Abdelrahman and a person who fell within the definition of “stepchild” in the Council’s policy was a proportionate means of pursuing a legitimate aim and there was, therefore, no unlawful discrimination. Ms Abdelrahman appealed, arguing that in the Court’s ruling. The definition of “stepchild” had been restricted to what section 113 of the Housing Act 1985 meant when it was enacted in 1985. The real question was what “stepchild” meant in the present day, arguing that a modern family relationship is not confined to legal or blood relationships.

The Court of Appeal, in dismissing the appeal, held that the Council’s interpretation of “stepchild” as requiring a parent's marriage or civil partnership with the tenant was valid and did not discriminate against Ms Abdelrahman under articles 8 and 14 of the European Convention on Human Rights. It found that the Council’s succession policy intended to provide clarity and certainty in the allocation of social housing, and its rationale was proportionate and compliant with the European Convention on Human Rights.

This decision will be welcomed by local housing authorities and provides clarity on the definition of “stepchild”.

A copy of the judgment is here.

R. (on the application of Begum) v Tower Hamlets LBC [2025] EWCA Civ 1049

Court of Appeal - 31 July 2025

The Court of Appeal has held that a local authority’s use of a database for homeless applicants seeking property transfers did not constitute indirect discrimination against women.

In May 2021, Ms Begum applied to the London Borough of Tower Hamlets (“the Council”) as being homeless and was provided the same day with studio accommodation until longer-term accommodation could be found. Ms Begum had a child (and was pregnant with a second child) and subsequently, in June 2022, requested a transfer due to overcrowding at the accommodation. In October 2022, the Council accepted a main housing duty towards her under section 193 of the Housing Act 1996 and noted that she had requested a transfer due to overcrowding. In June 2023, after Ms Begum’s solicitors had requested a review of the suitability of the accommodation, the Council invited them to withdraw the request as it accepted that the accommodation had become unsuitable from that date. In August 2023, the Council offered Ms Begum new accommodation, which she accepted, prior to the birth of her second child.

Between October 2022 and August 2023, Ms Begum had been on the Council’s database, awaiting an offer of suitable accommodation. She argued that the Council had a provision, criterion or practice (PCP) in its arrangements of its information database for suitable accommodation and that it was indirectly discriminatory, as it put women at a particular disadvantage compared with men. Consequently, Ms Begum applied for judicial review of the Council’s exercise of its homelessness functions under the Housing Act 1996, claiming that how the Council had treated her homelessness application breached sections 19 and149 of the Equality Act 2010.

The High Court, in dismissing the application, held that the accommodation had been unsuitable since October 2022, but rejected Ms Begum’s argument that the arrangements were indirectly discriminatory. It found that women were more likely to be placed in temporary accommodation than men because single-parent households were overrepresented in temporary accommodation and significantly more likely to be headed by women. It was not satisfied that the Council’s arrangements for suitable accommodation were a PCP and, even if they were, did not put women at a disadvantage. Ms Begum appealed.

The Court of Appeal, in dismissing the appeal, held that the alleged PCP did not place women at a particular disadvantage compared to men and, even if it did, the Council’s actions were a proportionate means of achieving a legitimate aim. It also held that the public sector equality duty under the Equality Act 2010 had not been breached.

A copy of the judgment is here.