On 5 January 2024, the GOC’s Fitness to Practise Committee (the FPC) found Mr Patel, a registered optometrist, guilty of serious misconduct involving dishonesty and found that his fitness to practise was currently impaired. The FPC imposed a nine-month suspension from practice, which did not take effect due to the appeal.

This insight considers the background and judgment in Patel v General Optical Council [2026] EWCA Civ 1206, which was handed down on 22 September 2026. The case demonstrates a difference between defective judicial process and an unsafe judicial decision, with regard to CPR 52.21(3)(b). Concerned with serious procedural irregularity causing injustice, this case makes clear that in order to rely upon a breach of this rule in a successful appeal, an appellant must demonstrate that not only did such an irregularity occur, but also that the decision was unjust because of that irregularity.

Substantive hearing

Mr Patel appealed the FPC’s decision to the High Court. On 20 November 2024, his appeal was heard remotely by Richard Clayton KC, sitting as a Deputy High Court Judge (the Deputy Judge). The Deputy Judge had undergone surgery for a ruptured Achilles tendon and had returned from hospital the day before. He therefore conducted the hearing from his bed and raised with the parties the difficulties he was experiencing in conducting the hearing “sitting prone in bed…”. Despite the difficulties, the Deputy Judge participated actively during the hearing and took a note of the proceedings. Neither Mr Patel nor the GOC made an application for the hearing to be adjourned, so that it could either be dealt with by the Deputy Judge when he was in better health or heard by a different judge.

On 6 December 2024, the Deputy Judge provided a draft oral judgment noting that Mr Patel’s appeal was dismissed and notified the parties that a written judgment would be provided for corrections before a formal hand down. No note of the hearing had been provided, so the precise terms of the draft oral judgment are not known.

In January 2025, the GOC wrote to the court seeking the Deputy Judge’s written draft of the judgment.

In February 2025, the court asked the parties for a draft order from the 6 December hearing and both parties agreed that no orders had been made. From April 2025 to September 2025, the GOC continued to chase for the written draft judgment. A listing was due to take place on 3 December 2025 and whilst preparing for the hearing, the lawyers for Mr Patel found what looked like an approved judgment on Westlaw. It was not available from the National Archives and had not been provided to Mr Patel, his lawyers or the GOC. The hearing planned for 3 December 2025 was adjourned to 20 January 2026.

On 20 January 2026, the Deputy Judge did not hand down a final version of his judgment. He explained that he had not received emails asking for the judgment and accepted that the draft judgment (the version that had been published on Westlaw) contained typographical errors. He also refused Mr Patel’s permission to appeal on all grounds including criticisms of the Deputy Judge’s conduct of the hearing on 20 November 2024.

In an order dealing with consequential matters (but not disposing with the appeal itself), the Deputy Judge extended time to apply to the Court of Appeal for permission to appeal until 21 days after receipt of the final written judgment. He directed the parties to lodge further written submissions by 23 January 2026 addressing:

  • the Court’s power to remit the question of sanction to the FPC due to matters that had arisen after the FPC’s decision;
  • costs; and
  • a stay of execution pending appeal to the Court of Appeal.

The Deputy Judge provided his judgment on consequential matters on 12 March 2026. On 16 March 2026, both parties emailed the Court, pointing out that they had still not received the final written judgment from the hearing on 6 December 2024, nor a determination of the matters on which submissions had been made on 23 January 2026.

On 17 March 2026, the final substantive judgment, dismissing the appeal and dated 6 December 2024, was provided to the parties. No order was made following that decision and therefore the suspension imposed by the FPC had still not taken effect.

On 1 April 2026, Mr Patel sought permission for a second appeal to the Court of Appeal.

The sole ground of the appeal was that: “The general handling of the appeal by the [Deputy Judge] and the court under his direction raises serious concern that the applicant’s appeal has not been dealt with to the standard to be expected of the court such that the judgment is not reliable.”

On 8 April 2026, the GOC raised the outstanding issues with the court, including costs. There was no order disposing of the appeal to the Deputy Judge, no determination of the outstanding consequential issues, including costs, and no final version of the judgment delivered on 20 January 2026.

Hearing before the Court of Appeal

Mr Patel advanced his case under CPR 52.21(3)(b), arguing that the decision was unjust because of serious procedural irregularity. He did not advance that the Deputy Judge’s substantive decision was incorrect.

During the hearing, Mr Patel sought to challenge the Deputy Judge’s substantive reasoning and decision, contending that the alleged errors were arguably “injustice” resulting from the procedural irregularities. This argument was refused because it had not been advanced as a ground of appeal and no notice was given.

The skeleton argument is referenced as raising the following points:

  • the practical difficulties the Deputy Judge had at the hearing of 20 November 2024 with reading PDFs and taking notes;
  • the apparent fact that the Deputy Judge was not in “an ideal state” to hear the case, as evidenced by his reference to the case not being easy and to being tired;
  • the difficulties and delays in the production of judgments and orders;
  • the overall appearance that the case was not managed properly and reliably, in breach of the principle recognised in R v Sussex Justice, ex parte McCarthy [1924] 1 KB 256 that justice “should manifestly and undoubtedly be seen to be done”.

In oral submissions, Mr Patel’s representative did not pursue the first point.

The permission to appeal was refused. The Court of Appeal held that there was no real prospect of successfully establishing that the Deputy Judge’s decision was unjust because of procedural irregularity.

The court decided that what had occurred was not acceptable. It was noted that the Deputy Judge could not stand, conducted the hearing in an unconventional position from his bed, initially struggled to manipulate the electronic bundles and take notes, described the case as difficult, referred to his stamina being tested and later raised that he was tired.

However, Mr Patel’s appeal could not succeed simply by establishing that there were significant procedural defects. It had to show whether the decision was unjust because of an irregularity.

The Court distinguished between suboptimal conditions and an inability of the Deputy Judge to discharge his judicial function. It was noted that the Deputy Judge did engage with the material, understood the arguments, took notes, had a proper grasp of the case, and took a break where necessary. He had also provided substantive reasons as he had initially given them orally 16 days after the hearing.

It was also noted that there had been a full and careful consideration of Mr Patel’s appeal by the Deputy Judge and prompt and unobjectionable reasons for its dismissal.

Key takeaways

The Court of Appeal stated that procedural irregularities did not result in an arguable case of injustice. It was found that the procedure was unsatisfactory, but the resulting decision was not shown to be unjust.

Unacceptable process does not automatically produce an unsafe decision. The appellant must identify how the procedural irregularity materially affected the judge’s consideration of the case or otherwise rendered the resulting decision unjust.

Under CPR 52.3B, where the appeal is one to which Rule 52.3(1)(c)(iv) applies, an application for permission to appeal for a second time must be made to the Court of Appeal.

Interestingly, the Court of Appeal provided no comment on Mr Patel’s attempt to persuade the Deputy Judge to grant permission to appeal to the Court of Appeal at the hearing on 20 January 2026. Nor was any comment made on the Deputy Judge purporting to extend time to the parties to apply to the Court of Appeal for permission to appeal.

Additionally, Mr Patel’s counsel’s attempt to identify errors in the judgment was not allowed by the Court of Appeal because this had not been included in the grounds of appeal. Where either party intends to rely on submissions, they must be included in the grounds of appeal.

The Deputy Judge was criticised for reading out a draft judgment. The Court also considered it unacceptable that repeated emails from the parties seeking to finalise the judgment and order went unanswered. Phillips LJ, with Falk LJ in agreement, criticised the failure to ensure that the judgment was properly progressed. It was their view that a judge should make arrangements to follow up after any decision to ensure that any further submissions are received and that an appropriate order is made.

The Deputy Judge was commended for his willingness to hear a case whilst recovering from injury and doing so from his bed. However, they concluded that despite there being no injustice, the Deputy Judge should not have sat in the circumstances that he did.

The Court said that conducting a hearing from bed or otherwise without conventional working arrangements should be a last resort, potentially justified where the matter is exceptionally urgent or a particular judge is uniquely required. Neither circumstance applied in this case. A judge should have basic working conditions to conduct a hearing properly. Therefore, it was not appropriate for the Deputy Judge to hear the case from his bed, but this did not result in an unjust decision.

In the aftermath of this judgment, it is unlikely that any judge sitting in the High Court will seek to conduct an appeal hearing in the same manner as attempted by the Deputy Judge in this case (except in circumstances requiring urgent resolution of an appeal).

Regulators and registered professionals alike should note the observations from the Court of Appeal on both the conduct of the first appeal and the difficulties the parties encountered in attempting to chase the Court for a finalised judgment and/or order.

How Capsticks can help

Capsticks’ market-leading professional regulatory lawyers act for a wide range of statutory and non-statutory regulatory bodies. Our team of specialists are experienced at navigating complex issues such as those discussed in this article. To find out more, please contact Senior Associate Zahra Evans or another member of the Regulatory team. This article was authored with contributions from Victoria Menard.