Global 100 Ltd v Ross and others [2025] UKUT 264 (LC)

Upper Tribunal (Lands Chamber) - 12 August 2025

The Upper Tribunal (Lands Chamber) has held that property guardian companies are not exempt from the requirement to license a house in multiple occupation just because it is owned by a local authority.

The London Borough of Haringey (“The Council”) had entered into a written agreement with a company, Global Guardians Management Ltd (“GGM”), which permitted GGM to use a property for live-in guardianship services in exchange for a monthly payment of £980. GGM then granted permission to the appellant, Global 100 Ltd, to grant licences to live-in guardians, including the six respondents. Under the licences, the respondents were required to pay a weekly fee to Global 100. The Council did not receive any payments from the respondents.

Under section 43 of the Housing and Planning Act 2016, the respondents applied to the First-tier Tribunal (Property Chamber) for rent repayment orders (“RROs”) against Global 100, alleging that Global 100 had committed an offence under section 72(1) of the Housing Act 2004, namely of having control of, or managing, a house in multiple occupation (“HMO”) which ought to have been licensed. However, under Schedule 14 of the Housing Act 2004, a property was not deemed to be an HMO for the purposes of that offence where the person having control of ,or managing, the building was a local authority. Relying on section 263(3)(b) of the Housing Act 2004, Global 100 argued that the building was not an HMO because the “person managing” the building was the Council (and it was therefore precluded from being an HMO). The key question to be determined was whether the Council was actually the “person managing” or having control for the purposes of section 263(3)(b) of the Housing Act 2004,

The First-tier Tribunal (Property Chamber) held that the Council was not a “person managing” and that Global 100 had committed the offence. It made RROs in favour of the respondents. Global 100 appealed to the Upper Tribunal (Lands Chamber).

The Upper Tribunal (Lands Chamber), in dismissing the appeal, held that the Council was not a “person managing” the building because it did not receive the rent payable to Global 100. It held that property guardian companies cannot rely on the Schedule 14 of the Housing Act 2004 exemption from the requirement to license an HMO just because a local authority owns the property. Consequently, the First-tier Tribunal (Property Chamber) had not erred in its findings and the building was therefore an unlicensed HMO.

The ruling highlights that even if the owner of a building is a local authority, it is the nature of the agreements with those subletting the building that will determine whether an exception from HMO licencing can be applied.

A copy of the judgment is here.

Enfield LBC v A [2025] EWCA Civ 1355

Court of Appeal - 27 October 2025

The Court of Appeal has held that a local authority’s failure to notify another authority of an out-of-borough placement did not affect the suitability of the accommodation offered.

The respondent (“Ms A”) had applied to London Borough of Enfield (“The Council”) for homelessness assistance. The Council accepted that it owed her the full housing duty under s.193(2) of the Housing Act 1996. However, Ms A had been the victim of domestic abuse in Enfield and therefore did not want to be accommodated in the town, fearing further violence from her former partner and his family and friends. Ms A was offered, and accepted, accommodation in the neighbouring borough of Haringey, but requested a review of its suitability, citing various reasons, including its size, disrepair and the fact that it was in close proximity to Enfield. Although she was willing to consider living in Haringey, she asked if she could preferably be housed in Waltham Cross in Broxbourne or Northwood in Hillingdon. The Council’s placement policy was to house residents within its borough wherever possible, but to support a move to accommodation outside the borough on occasion, including where there was an ongoing threat to a person’s safety if they remain in Enfield.

On review, the reviewing officer determined that the accommodation was suitable. The review decision noted that Haringey was one of the areas that Ms A had indicated that she was willing to consider, and that whilst the placement was not local, it had been offered at her request. The Council, though, failed to notify London Borough of Haringey of Ms A’s out-of-borough placement within the 14-day statutory time limit allowed under section 208 of the Housing Act 1996. Ms A subsequently successfully appealed the reviewing officer’s decision to the County Court. The Council appealed.

The Court of Appeal, in allowing the appeal, held that the Council has properly applied its own placement policy and had complied with its duty to secure accommodation within its district “so far as reasonably practicable”. It would not have been “reasonably practicable” to house Ms A in Enfield, where she would be in possible danger from her former partner. The fact that Ms A had also expressed preferences for locations in Waltham Cross and Northwood, which were further away than Haringey, suggested that the distance between Enfield and the offered accommodation in Haringey was not an important consideration to her. The Council’s failure to notify London Borough of Haringey of Ms A’s placement within 14 days did not invalidate its suitability review decision.

This decision will be welcomed by local authorities, as it confirms that a breach of the notification duty following an out-of-borough placement will not necessarily overturn a suitability review decision. However, it is important to ensure that notifications are made within 14 days to avoid possible penalties.

A copy of the judgment is here.

London Borough of Wandsworth v Young [2025] EWCA Civ 1336

Court of Appeal - 21 October 2025

The Court of Appeal has held that a local authority is not required to notify a housing applicant of their right to review when its main housing duty ended following the acceptance of accommodation

The appellant (“Mr Young”), who had been diagnosed with autism and ADHD, was granted temporary accommodation by London Borough of Wandsworth (“The Council”) under section 188(1) of the Housing Act 1996. The Council subsequently accepted that it owed him the main housing duty under s.193 of the Housing Act 1996 and offered him permanent accommodation. Mr Young was told that if he accepted the offer, the Council’s duty under section 193 would cease. Mr Y signed the tenancy agreement but later sought a review of the suitability of the offer. Following the review, the Council confirmed that the accommodation offered was suitable and that its section 193 duty had been discharged. However, when the Council served Mr Young with a notice to quit his temporary accommodation, he refused to vacate the accommodation, and it therefore initiated possession proceedings.

Mr Young appealed to the County Court, arguing that he was still owed the main housing duty by the Council at the date of the possession proceedings because (i) he had not received proper notification under section 184 about the end of the duty or his right to seek a review of the decision; and (ii) he had not accepted the offer of permanent accommodation since he lacked the capacity to do so. His appeal was dismissed on both grounds and he was ordered to leave the accommodation. Mr Young appealed to the Court of Appeal.

The Court of Appeal, in dismissing his appeal, held that section 184 only applies to initial inquiries when a person first applies for accommodation, not to the cessation of the main housing duty under section 193. Even if the Council was legally required to inform Mr Young of a right to request a review, he could not raise this issue in possession proceedings. There were no exceptional circumstances to justify a different approach.

This decision will be welcomed by local authorities, as it clarifies their notification duties under the Housing Act 1996 when discharging the main housing duties under section 193 of the Act.

A copy of the judgment is here.

Sleaford House Tenants Association v Harca [2025] UKUT 359 (LC)

Upper Tribunal (Lands Chamber) - 22 October 2025

The Upper Tribunal had held that the First-tier Tribunal had been entitled to refuse an application to grant a certificate of recognition to a tenants’ association, as it had a membership shortfall.

The Sleaford and Gayton Residents' Association (“The Association”) had made an application to the First-tier Tribunal (Property Chamber) for a certificate of recognition under section 29(1)(b)(i) of the Landlord and Tenant Act 1985. The application was for the grant of a certificate for an association representing both Sleaford House and Gayton House, and it stated that each block had 99 flats. In the box on the application form which asked for the number of flats for which variable service charges were payable, the Association’s representative wrote “unsure”; however, the number of flats whose tenants were members of the Association was said to be only 22. The respondent housing association established that there were 97 long leaseholders across both blocks, giving the association approximately 20 per cent representation.

The application was refused by the First-tier Tribunal (Property Chamber) because fewer than 50 per cent of qualifying tenants were members of the Association and, as a result, it was unable to grant a certificate in light of this prohibition, which was laid out in regulation 4(1) of the Tenants' Associations (Regulations Relating to Recognition and Provision of Information) (England) Regulations 2018.

The Association appealed, but for the application to Sleaford House only.

The Upper Tribunal (Lands Chamber), in dismissing the appeal, held that the First-tier Tribunal (Property Chamber) had correctly applied regulation 4(1) of the Tenants' Associations (Regulations Relating to Recognition and Provision of Information) (England) Regulations 2018. The association had only 22 members across both housing blocks, while there were 97 long leasehold flats in the two blocks, falling below the statutory requirement that at least 50 per cent of qualifying tenants must be members of the Association as per regulation 4. Although, the Association had attempted to modify its application to seek recognition for Sleaford House only, the First-tier Tribunal (Property Chamber) had correctly decided the case based on the application before it at the time, which was for both blocks. The original application could not be amended retrospectively.

A copy of the judgment is here.