Bano v London Borough of Waltham Forest [2026] UKSC 22

Supreme Court - 22 July 2026

The Supreme Court has held that a local authority’s main housing duty automatically ceases on the acceptance or refusal of private rented sector offer

In May 2017, Mrs Bano applied to the London Borough of Waltham Forest (“The Council”) for housing assistance under Part 7 of the Housing Act 1996. The Council accepted that it owed her a duty under section 193 of the Housing Act 1996 and provided her with temporary accommodation. In June 2020, the Council offered her private sector accommodation in Derby. Mrs Bano, refused the offer and the Council considered that this refusal had ended its duty to her. Ms Bano did not seek to review the decision and remained in the temporary accommodation. In November 2022, the Council issued proceedings against Mrs Bano for possession of the temporary accommodation. In response to this, Ms Bano issued a judicial review claim, contending that the offer of accommodation had failed to comply with section 193 of the Housing Act 1996 and therefore the Council still owed her a duty. Whilst the Council accepted that its offer had been defective, in that it had not mentioned the effect of section 195A (“Re-application after private rented sector offer”) as a consequence of accepting the offer, it argued that Mrs Bano had other remedies to judicial review, such as applying for a review of the decision under section 202 of the Housing Act 1996, but had not exercised those rights.

The High Court, in allowing the claim, held that that section 202 of the Housing Act 1996 was only available where the Council had decided that the section 193 duty had ended – but neither in the offer letter nor subsequently had it made a decision that its duty had ended. It should have made a separate decision about whether its duty had ended. The Council appealed.

The Court of Appeal, in allowing the appeal, held section 193 of the Housing Act 1996 does not require a separate decision or a notification that a Council’s duty has ended in the case of a private rented sector offer; rather, the duty ceased automatically on the refusal of the offer by Mrs Bano. Mrs Bano appealed.

The Supreme Court, in unanimously dismissing the appeal, held that the main housing duty under section 193 of the Housing Act 1996 ceases automatically where an applicant accepts or refuses a private rented sector offer that satisfies the statutory requirements. A local housing authority is not required to decide whether the duty has ceased or to notify the housing applicant of that decision.

This decision will be welcomed by local housing authorities, as it confirms that in these circumstances the housing duty ends automatically on the refusal of a private rented sector offer.

A copy of the judgment is here.

Stonewater Ltd v Harris County Court (Portsmouth) [2026] EWCC 42

County Court - 13 July 2026

The County Court has held that CPR 70.2A empowers social landlords to force entry to their properties to carry gas and electrical safety checks.

During 2025, the landlord (“Stonewater Ltd”) made a series of requests, initially through contractors and then directly, for access to the tenant’s (“Mrs Harris”) property in order to carry out an Electrical Installation Condition Report. Mrs Harris was given a series of warnings as to the costs and other consequences of failing to provide access, but Stonewater Ltd received no response

The tenancy agreement contained a covenant requiring the tenant to allow Stonewater Ltd access at reasonable hours on 48 hours' notice to carry out an inspection and any repairs, together with a separate emergency clause permitting entry using such means as necessary without prior notice. After receiving no response to its multiple access requests, Stonewater Ltd obtained an injunction from the District Court requiring Mrs Harris to permit it access to the property; however, the District Court declined to include a forced entry provision to the injunction, holding that a tenant has exclusive possession of the property and, accordingly, any entry to the property by a landlord would be a trespass.

Subsequently, and after making three further unsuccessful attempts to gain access to the property, Stonewater Ltd applied to vary the order to include a forced entry provision and a provision for a key to be left in a key safe attached to the external wall of the property. The District Court determine that the application should be heard by the County Court

The County Court, in granting the application, held that a court had power under rule 70.2A(2) (“Court may order act to be done at expense of disobedient party”) of the Civil Procedure Rules 1998 (“CPR70.2A(2)”) to make an order permitting a landlord to force entry to one of its rented premises in order to carry out gas or electrical safety inspections, where an injunction requiring the tenant to permit access had not been complied with. If access cannot be enabled by the tenant's consent, then CPR70.2A(2) permitted the Court to empower the landlord to enable access in another way. It also held that affixing a key safe to the outside of the premises represented good practice. The Court also set out conditions to which any such order should be subject, including that forced entry should take place only on 48 hours' prior notice and should not proceed where the tenant was present and actively opposing entry.

This decision will be welcomed by social landlords, particularly those who regularly have difficulties in obtaining access to their properties in order to carry out gas and electrical safety inspections. However, until there is authority from a higher court, social landlords should remain cautious when approaching this contentious issue.

Capsticks Partner Sarah Christy has written a detailed overview of this case, highlighting the practical steps that social landlords should take when seeking an injunction that includes a forced access provision.

A copy of the judgment is here.

R. (on the application of Howard De Walden Estates Ltd) v Westminster City Council [2026] EWHC 1731 (Admin)

High Court - 9 July 2026

The Hight Court has held that ward-based selective licensing designation by a local authority is rational and lawful.

Howard De Walden Estates Ltd (“The Landowner”) owned land within two wards, Marylebone and West End, that were governed by Westminster City Council (“the Council”). In 2025, the Council designated seven wards as subject to selective licensing under Part 3 of the Housing Act 2004, including those two wards, for a five-year period on the basis of high levels of poor housing conditions and significant and persistent anti-social behaviour.

The Council had engaged a housing data analysis company to conduct predictive modelling of housing conditions and anti-social behaviour at property level, with the findings aggregated and reported at ward level, and engaged a consultancy business to assess the feasibility of the scheme and evaluate statutory compliance. The Council’s subsequent Cabinet Report found that both the Marylebone and West End wards featured elevated levels of predicted housing hazards and anti-social behaviour incidents.

The Landowner was granted permission to challenge the decision by way of judicial review, arguing that it was unlawful and irrational for the Council to have designated entire wards to selective licensing rather than just specific areas. It argued that the Council should have been more selective and should have designated more limited areas within wards, such as specific streets, and that it should have been more geographically targeted, excluding the Landlord’s Estate. It submitted that reliance on predictive modelling, unverified by physical inspections, was unlawful.

The High Court, in refusing the application, held that the Council had acted lawfully and rationally in designating ward boundaries (rather than more limited areas) and for not excluding the Landowners’ Estate. The Court found that:

• Ward-based boundary designation was not irrational but a deliberate and considered choice made for logical reasons. Westminster’s dense urban environment, with privately-rented sector properties spread throughout mixed-use neighbourhoods, meant that singling out pockets within wards for selective licensing purposes would risk inconsistency and a fragmented regulatory approach. Ward-level designation provided operational clarity.

• Predictive modelling rather than physical inspections was rational and appropriate. Physical inspections across an entire borough would be labour-intensive, impractical, and subject to access bias.

• The high number of properties with repeat anti-social behaviour across the Marylebone and West End wards meant that the Council’s inferences that anti-social behaviour was persistent, and that some landlords were failing to take appropriate action to address it, was a rational conclusion.

• The Council had given proper consideration to alternative actions to designation as a whole and to ward-based boundaries. It’s conclusion that designation by wards was the best approach was rational

The decision will be welcomed by local authorities that are considering large-scale designations, as it provides confirmation that ward-based designation (and predictive modelling for assessing housing conditions and management standards) is not necessarily irrational or open to challenge.

A copy of the judgment is here.