In August 2025, a Medical Practitioners Tribunal (the Tribunal) determined that Dr Amy Eskander’s registration should be suspended for 12 months. She appealed this decision to the High Court. Mansfield J dismissed her appeal, ordering that her appeal was out of time, and it would not be appropriate to extend time. The question of whether Dr Eskander’s statutory appeal was out of time then progressed to the Court of Appeal.

The Court’s decision in Eskander v GMC [2026] EWCA Civ 372, handed down on 31 March 2026, provides important clarification on when a statutory appeal is “brought” in regulatory proceedings, and the extent to which procedural missteps such as the non-payment of fees will be overlooked to preserve a practitioner’s right of appeal. In the judgment, the Court considered the case of Siniakovich v Hassan-Soudey [2026] EWCA Civ 215, which held that an action is only “brought” when the claim form is delivered to the Court office.

This insight outlines the background and the judgment in the case of Eskander v GMC, and what the decision means for professional regulators.

The background

Dr Eskander wished to appeal a decision of the Tribunal suspending her registration. She sent an email to the Administrative Court Office (ACO) on 23 September (the last day of the 28-day appeal period) on counsel’s advice, filing her appeal notice, the Grounds of Appeal and Skeleton Argument.

She did not pay the fee, but she understood that she would be asked for payment upon sending the email to the ACO, again on counsel’s advice.

On 21 October, the ACO issued the notice by sealing it. As well as a seal with the date of 21 October, the form had a box completed by the ACO which noted that the “date filed” was 23 September.

On 23 October, the GMC applied to strike out her appeal as it had not been “commenced” within 28 days, because no fee had been paid on 23 September when it was filed.

Mansfield J struck out the appeal on the papers on the basis that it was not brought in time (the appropriate fee did not accompany the notice, as required by PD 52B), and it was not appropriate to extend the deadline in the circumstances.

The question for the Court of Appeal was whether Dr Eskander’s statutory appeal against a decision of the Tribunal was out of time, and if it was, whether time can and should be extended.

The judgment

The Court of Appeal allowed her appeal, reinstating her statutory appeal. Nugee LJ, with whom Baker and Cobb LJJ agreed, held that, by analogy with the recent case of Siniakovich v Hassan-Soudey, her appeal was brought in time despite the fact that she did not pay the requisite, or any, fee on delivering the appellant’s notice as she should have done.

Alternatively, if that ground had not been allowed, in the circumstances where a Registrant had done all that they reasonably could to bring the appeal timeously, relying on counsel’s advice, the Court would have granted the necessary extension of time.

The reasons behind the judgment can be broken down as follows:

Fresh evidence

First, Dr Eskander sought to offer fresh evidence which was not before the High Court. This consisted of an account of her communications with her barrister around the time of filing her appeal notice. She was given permission to rely on this fresh evidence: the Court in particular considered the first condition set out in Ladd v Marshall, noting the Court’s broad discretion to admit new evidence (applying the overriding objective) and that the standard of diligence required of a litigant for an interlocutory application less than required for a trial.

Grounds

In her Grounds of Appeal, Dr Eskander argued that the recent case of Siniakovich v Hassan-Soudey, which held that an action is “brought” when the claim form is delivered to the Court office, even if there is an underpayment of the appropriate fee, should not be distinguished in her case.

She further argued that the time for appealing should be extended in her case.

The Medical Act 1983

S.40(4) of the Medical Act 1983 (the Act) provides: “A person in respect of whom an appealable decision falling within subsection (1) has been taken may, before the end of 28 days beginning with the date upon which notification of the decision was served under section 35E(1) above, or section 41(10) below, appeal against the decision to the relevant court.”

The Act provides very limited power (Paragraph 9, Schedule 4) to extend the time for appealing if a notification was sent by post and not received within 14 days, and there is no other statutory provision for extension of time for appealing.

The question for the Court of Appeal was whether Dr Eskander had done enough to "appeal against the decision of the relevant Court" within the meaning of s.40(4) of the Act.

Siniakovich

The Court rejected a number of arguments seeking to distinguish Siniakovich: first, the GMC argued that Dr Eskander did not pay any fee at all. The Court rejected this, taking the view that there was no logical distinction between paying part of the fee or none of it.

The GMC further sought to distinguish this statutory appeal from an action, pointing to the risk of a lacuna where a sanctioned doctor could deliver an appeal notice but not pay the issue fee and so “bring” an appeal that could then not be withdrawn or dismissed, and indefinitely prevent the sanction of a tribunal taking effect. The Court recognised the danger of this potential lacuna, but felt there was likely a solution in a court demanding the fee before treating the appeal as withdrawn; and in any event, the Court felt this hypothetical issue was less unsatisfactory than seeking to maintain a distinction between a claim and a statutory appeal.

Further, the GMC sought to argue that Dr Eskander had filed her notice by email when she should not have been allowed to do so. PD 5B 2.2 notes that in the High Court, a party must not email an application to the court where a fee is payable for that document to be filed with the court. Dr Eskander referred to para 2.4, which appears to confer a discretion however “may refuse…where (a) the sender has not complied with paragraph 2.2’. But the Court found that here the ACO did in fact accept her notice.

The Court of Appeal therefore concluded:

Dr Eskander delivered her appellant's notice to the ACO before the expiry of the 28-day period allowed her by s. 40(4) of the Medical Act 1983; it was not rejected; and in due course it was issued. That, by analogy with Siniakovich, means that her appeal was brought in time despite the fact that she did not pay the requisite, or any, fee on delivering the appellant's notice as she should have done.

The Court held that the time for appealing should be extended if it was required. E had done all she reasonably could to bring the appeal timeously. If non-payment of the fee meant it was out of time, then the Court should extend the time for appealing.

The effect of this ruling was to resurrect Dr Eskander’s statutory appeal in the High Court. It remains to be seen whether Dr Eskander will ultimately succeed in her attempt to reduce the sanction that was imposed upon her by the Tribunal.

Key takeaways

This case is a further example of the courts being reluctant to enforce procedural requirements too rigidly if to do so would deprive a registered professional of their statutory right to appeal a decision made by their regulatory body. Further lessons from the case include the below:

• As to the admission of fresh evidence, considering Ladd v Marshall, the due diligence required at interlocutory stage may be less than at trial.
• There is no distinction between an action and a statutory appeal in relation to the deadline for ‘bringing’ a claim/notice to court.
• There is no logical basis for an underpayment or non-payment of the fee to invalidate the timing of that ‘bringing’ of a claim.
• A Registrant who has done all they reasonably can (including relying on legal advice/guidance) to bring an appeal timeously can expect the court to exercise its discretion and extend the time for appealing.

How Capsticks can help

Capsticks’ leading specialist professional regulatory lawyers advise regulators on statutory appeals and procedural compliance. If you would like to reach out about the services we offer or would like to discuss an issue raised in this article, please contact Principal Associate Alexander Barnfield or Associate Helena Gadsby to find out more about how Capsticks can help.